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Red Sea Pilot
– Reports of Piracy and Suspected
Piracy Update 09 April
2003
UPDATES: WE REQUEST
REPORTS OF ALL INCIDENTS AGAINST YACHTS IN THE RED SEA AND GULF OF
ADEN EVEN IF YOU WERE NOT PERSONALLY AFFECTED. PLEASE EMAIL TO
Morgdav@aol.com cc Imrays, ilnw@imray.com
From 1998 to date
there have been a total of eighteen recorded incidents in the Red
Sea and Gulf of Aden. Ten are confirmed cases of piracy or robbery
or attempted piracy or robbery. Two occurred within 70 miles of the
Somali coast, waters yachts are strongly advised to avoid. Three
occurred in Yemeni waters and five about half way across the Gulf of
Aden. Of the remainder, seven have been
confirmed as having nothing to do with robbery or piracy. Four or
five of these were contact with pushy Yemeni military patrols. One
or two involved contact with fishermen mistaken for robbers. One
appears to be a case of a crime committed aboard.
Against ten confirmed incidents in this 5 season period,
hundreds of yachts have passed trouble-free north- or southbound
through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. NATO naval patrols in the
area are currently greatly improving security. However, we have had
recent reports of increased incidence of theft from yachts anchored
in the port of Djibouti. This is NOT piracy but a problem to be
aware of. For the following information we should like to thank
and offer sympathy to the victims on Lisestrambord, Ocean
Swan, Shady Lady, Blodeuwedd, and near victims on
Penyllan and Daisy
Duck.
Definitions Piracy: any illegal act of
violence, detention or any act of depredation committed for private
ends by the crew of a private vessel against another vessel on the
high seas (i.e. in international waters). Robbery: the crime of
theft of goods or chattels within a given
jurisdiction. International waters usually begin a minimum of 3M
and a maximum of 12M from a state's territorial baseline. Hence 4, 8
and 15 below were robbery, 2, 3, 12, 17 & 18 were piracy, and 1
& 5 attempted piracy. Details of incidents
(most recent first):
- 09/03/03 Australian yachts Penyllan, Sea Dove, Gypsy
Days and Narena in close company with American yacht
Imani were harassed at 0900LMT by gun fire from a distance of
about 0·5M when in 13°11'N 48°40'E, approximately 80 miles off the
Yemen coast and 90M from Somalia. The approaching boats were
described as "possibly old ship's lifeboats... probably made of
wood or GRP... visible on radar within 1·5 miles... and inboard
powered. They were covered with bright blue and orange plastic
sheeting possibly to conceal their identity or the identity of
their cargo..." They were similar to those described in the
incident involving Bambola (see below) and also carrying
passengers but the report from Penyllan estimates them to
be smaller, about 12m long. The yachts shook off pursuit by
maintaining a speed of 6–7knots. A Panamanian registered freighter
the ROYAL PESCADORES, visible on the southern horizon,
answered one of many VHF mayday calls and closed their position.
Then a US warship called and said he would be in their position in
3 hours. A report was also made to the German navy in Djibouti via
other yachts at anchor there. At 0912 an Orion 4-engined navy
aircraft flew over the yachts, made contact and searched without
success for the open boats. During the evening a US frigate also
checked the group of yachts and told them they planned to patrol
the problem area "for several days" and would welcome calls from
yachts on channel 16. The near victims think that sailing in a
convoy of five may have helped deter their assailants. Undoubted
piracy attempt.
- circa 02/03/03 British yacht Bambola Quatre, in company
with yacht Josephine, in 13°31'N 48°24'E, about 35M off the
Yemen coast, S of Bir Ali, was approached at first light by 3
boats described as fast ships' lifeboats, about 20m long, covered
with blue and orange sheeting. Shots were fired, Bambola
was boarded and radios, money, etc. were stolen. Both
Bambola and Josephine were damaged. The lifeboats
carried numerous passengers huddled under awnings, probably
illegal immigrants being smuggled from Somalia to Yemen. Undoubted
piracy.
- 14/04/02 French owned and registered catamaran,
Blodeuwedd, attacked at 1330LMT in 12°37'N 48°28'·3E, 80M
from both the Yemeni and the Somali coasts. There was a ship
passing close by. A small boat with about 7 men aboard approached
and fired warning shots when 50m away. Essential equipment was
wisely and effectively hidden. The yacht put out a distress call
on VHF and further shots were fired, some of which damaged hull
and mainsail. The ship did nothing. The armed attackers crashed
alongside causing damage. They then boarded the yacht and ordered
the crew to the foredeck. They were evidently extremely tense.
They demanded cash and proceeded to ransack down below and on
deck. Owner and crew offered no resistance. The robbers took all
three of the boat's outboard engines, solar panels and other high
value equipment and left about 1½ hours later in the direction of
Somalia. The word Somali was used repeatedly by them during the
attack. The ship had meanwhile sailed on without offering any
assistance. An intermediary in France was then contacted by
satphone (hidden during the attack). He raised the French navy in
Djibouti and reported the incident. The yacht headed for Mukalla
to try to find an engine. The navy put the yacht in contact with
the French embassy in the Yemen. Undoubted piracy.
- 23/02/01 Ocean Swan, Shady Lady and Mi
Marra were in approx 13°47'N, 48°12'E, 6–10M off the Yemen
coast near Balihaf. Around dawn (0645LMT) they saw three boats
fishing inshore of them. The boats released their gear and rapidly
closed on Ocean Swan which had Shady Lady in tow.
Shots which damaged rigging were fired by one boat when it was
some 200m away. The main attacker rammed Ocean Swan. A
second craft arrived on the other side but was then told to stand
off by the chief robber. The attacking craft were wood-built,
inboard diesel powered, local fishing boats with timber uprights
protruding above the gunwhale. The boat attacking Ocean
Swan had five crew, one armed with a Kalashnikov and two with
knives. Any identifying marks had been disguised by draping a
tarpaulin round the hull. The other craft each had 5 or 6 crew.
While the first was robbing Ocean Swan, one of the others
robbed Shady Lady. The third, standing off Ocean
Swan, may have been intended to attack Mi Marra but,
given Mi Marra was nearly a mile away, may have thought it
too risky. The craft attacking Ocean Swan spent 45mins–1hr
ransacking. There was extensive loss of easily moveable equipment
but, thanks to good stowage and on-board security, much was
missed. One of the owners was threatened with a knife and asked
for money. She told the intruder to ask her husband who gave him
the US$50 in his pocket. On Shady Lady the thieves ripped
out the VHF and stole money. During the incident Mi Marra
stood by but was helpless to intervene once arms had been
ruthlessly used. No help was forthcoming on any international
emergency channel on MF/HF and contact was made with us on
Fiddler's Green II purely by chance. The authorities in
Salalah were then alerted via help from Harmonie II and,
subsequently, an Inmarsat alert was broadcast. Contact was later
made with the harbourmaster in Mukalla who took all details by
radio. No help ever reached the victims. After the incident the
thieves seemed to have carried on
fishing!
All three yachts proceeded to Aden
and reported to the authorities. The latter were sympathetic but
apparently unable to enforce the law in an area of the Yemen,
which seems to be beyond central government control. Undoubted
robbery.
- 12/04/01 Italian owned, British registered, Daisy Duck,
attacked at 0740LMT in 12°55'N 48°20'E, 64 miles from the Yemeni
coast and 98 miles from the Somali coast. The attacking craft was
a blue, wooden traditional fishing boat with a small cabin roof
and a high, noisy exhaust. There were 3 crew of unknown
provenance. As the attacking boat approached the yacht, a Hyundai
container ship came up from astern. Four other ships were within
16M on radar. Daisy Duck contacted the container ship on
VHF 16 because they needed fuel and were worried about the closing
fishing boat. The container ship reassured them about the fishing
boat but said they couldn't stop to provide fuel. Shortly
afterwards the fishing boat closed to within 15m and asked
Daisy Duck to stop. When Daisy Duck refused and
accelerated, the fishing boat fired shots. There is no report of
the shots hitting Daisy Duck.
The
skipper of Daisy Duck was armed and had his gun stood-by.
He returned fire aggressively. Subsequently the one remaining
attacker who was still upright steered the attacking boat away, in
what direction is not known. Meanwhile the skipper's wife, below
with the two young children, sent Mayday calls on VHF16 and MF/HF
2182kHz, 4125kHz, 6215kHz, 8291kHz, 12290kHz and 16420kHz. There
were no replies, not even from the Hyundai container ship now 0·5M
off Daisy Duck's bow despite repeated, direct pleas.
Subsequently contact was made via ham radio with the Rome
Coastguard and the Italian embassy in Djibouti. Undoubted piracy
attempt.
- 27/01/01 Yachts Freedom, Tosimoh and
Mintaka were about 50M miles SSW of Mukalla in approx.
13°56'N 48°54'E at approx 1000LMT. The yachts were on a reciprocal
course with two fast huris (local fishing craft) which
looked like passing close to starboard. The approach was treated
as potentially aggressive. Alerts were sounded by the yachts on
VHF, SSB and GMDSS via Inmarsat C. A flare pistol was fired low
between the approaching boats and other similar deterrent action
was taken. The local craft veered away, resumed their original
course and met with up to four other huris about 1M away.
After ten minutes two different huris returned eastward
past the yachts. The alert sounded again. The huris were
told to go away by voice and gesture. They carried on past. An
interesting side effect of the GMDSS Inmarsat C distress alert is
that families in Germany and Britain were alerted by national
MRCCs. Mukalla port authorities were eventually alerted on
2182kHz. Probably contact with fishermen.
- 09/01/01 Freedom (Irish) and Tosimoh (German)
were approached at approx 1300LMT by two local fast boats about
10–15M SE of the Small Strait at Bab el Mandeb while sailing in
company with another German yacht, Mintaka. The first boat
swung to parallel Freedom. The bow man looked as though
poised to jump onto Freedom although in fact this position
is commonly adopted to trim local craft. A wave was exchanged.
Freedom broadcast an alert. The craft fell astern, appeared
to have engine trouble and was joined by the second. Both turned
away towards Tosimoh. Tosimoh brandished a mean
looking signal projector. After some shouting the two boats left
at speed in the direction of Mayyun. Meantime a nearby ship had
responded to the alert which was then cancelled. The incident was
reported in Aden as a suspected incidence of piracy/robbery. The
authorities believe this was a military patrol but this has not
been confirmed.
- 24/12/00 French yacht Lisestrambord was stopped by an
armed boat about 15M offshore between Balihaf and Bir Ali (approx
13°43'N, 48°12'E). The attack was made at 1430LMT by a boat
carrying about 50 people. The crew consisted of 5 men armed with
guns and knives but there were about 45 refugees also aboard –
men, women and children. Shots were fired in the air before
aggressive boarding which caused damage. They stole cameras, video
equipment, binoculars, polar jackets and alcohol. They were also
given US$300 under duress. They tried to insist that
Lisestrambord follow them to the coast (probably Yemeni,
but not specified), but the skipper refused. The incident was
reported to Immigration in Mukalla. Undoubted robbery.
- 26/10/00 Australian yacht Funtastic, close off Ras al
Ara, was approached by a military patrol which tried to persuade
the skipper to return with them to Ras al Ara. Funtastic
claimed shortage of fuel and the patrol left, satisfied with
baksheesh (some cigarettes and soft drink). The incident was not
reported to Yemeni officials, so the soldiers have not been
disciplined.
- During autumn 2000 the French yacht Anouchka passed
inside the exclusion zone around Mayyun (Perim Island) and was
technically in violation of regulations. A military patrol
approached. Some of the boat's crew were in uniform. The patrol
was pushy and demanded baksheesh. Anouchka reported the
incident and an Inmarsat piracy attack report was subsequently
broadcast and never cancelled. The incident was followed up by the
Yemeni authorities. The troops concerned have been punished.
- In the spring of 2000, at an unknown date, the single-handed
Polish yacht Sadyba, a white hulled, 10m Bermudian sloop,
went missing on passage between Djibouti and Massawa for causes
unknown. These are inaccurately charted waters with strong
currents, strong winds, brutal seas and much shipping traffic.
Unexplained disappearance.
- 27/01/00 Australian catamaran Gone Troppo attacked and
shot at in mid-Gulf of Aden about 70M from the Somali coast. One
crew member wounded. The yacht was immobilised by having a fishing
net dropped across its bows, subsequently fouling the propellers.
No replies to repeated VHF Mayday broadcasts. Extensive theft of
money and electronics. Subsequently pirates may have shadowed
Gone Troppo but left when contact was made with a passing
ship which offered protection. The robbers were Somali. Undoubted
robbery.
- 22/11/99 Panamanian registered Airflow, a 28m schooner,
approached on converging intercept courses by two vessels between
the Hanish Is and Bab el Mandeb. Avoided encounter by changing
course and by contacting Aden harbourmaster and a nearby tanker,
which Airflow then closed for further protection. Naval
assistance, sent by Aden authorities, arrived after the potential
threat had disappeared. Yemeni enquiries have ascertained that the
intercepting vessels were Yemeni military patrols.
- 18/11/99 Yacht Leonard Star, flag unknown, boarded by
armed men 2M E of Jazirat at Ta'ir in the Red Sea. Boarders
attempted to steer yacht towards Jazirat at Ta'ir. A threatened
satcoms phone call to the Aden authorities ended the incident and
the boarders were satisfied with drinks and food. Yemeni enquiries
have ascertained this was a military patrol. The soldiers
concerned have been punished.
- 11/11/99 Australian yacht Aphrodite III shot at when it
failed to stop after being threatened by pirates posing as police
off Ahwar, between Mukalla and Aden. Extensive theft of money and
equipment. The Yemeni government apprehended and imprisoned the
criminals, recovered the stolen goods and offered to make full
repairs to the yacht. This is the ONLY case of robbery when the
criminals have been caught and punished, possibly because of
extensive and immediate international press coverage of the
incident. Undoubted robbery.
- 11/09/99 French yacht Correlation, on arrival in Aden,
reported an attack 6M off NE tip of Somalia. The crew comprised
two men and a woman. One of the two male crew was reported to have
been shot dead by pirates when he attempted to fight back. This
was neither confirmed nor denied by the female crew. The Aden
authorities report that when the yacht reached its next port of
call in the Red Sea, only the skipper was still aboard. Police
investigations in Europe continue. A probable on-board crime.
- End of 1999. Details are sketchy. German yacht Nono
hijacked when close in shore off Cape Guardafui, Somalia. Crew
kidnapped and subsequently released following negotiations between
German foreign service officials and the hijackers. A ransom may
have been paid. The yacht and its contents were entirely lost.
Undoubted piracy.
- 29/04/99 Finnish yacht Violetta hijacked 70M off
Bosaso, N Somalia. Crew initially ransomed but subsequently
released with no payment via offices of UN and pirates' village
elders. Yacht later recovered, but it had been stripped. Undoubted
piracy.
What to expect Help: Unless you have
organized an escort (see Somalia and Yemen in Prevention and
Protection below) you CANNOT EXPECT ANY HELP. In ALL BUT ONE of the
recent cases, when distress calls were made on international
distress frequencies, there was no response. In contravention of the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Chapter
V, even nearby ships may ignore you. YOU MUST BE READY TO HELP
YOURSELF. The positive news is that NATO navy patrols in the Gulf of
Aden and Horn of Africa area may help deter attacks. Second, the
Hart Group (see Somalia below) patrols aggressively using high speed
RIBs off the Somali coast between Bosaso and Cape Guardafui, which
may help as well. And finally it does appear from a recent IMO
meeting that a Yemeni Coastguard will soon be a reality.
Attackers: Here are some general findings from the
incidents we know of:
- From the most recent reports there appears now to be a maximum
danger area running from the Yemeni coast in the longitude of Bir
Ali (48°10'E to 48°25'E) to the Somali coast.
- The known attacks are products of chance encounters – you and
a few hoodlums/smugglers unluckily in the same patch of water at
the same time. There is no indication of organized crime, radio
frequency monitoring, radar or any other sophisticated aids to
detecting and intercepting victims, though there are suspicions
that intelligence on yacht movements may be being gathered from
yachts passing through Mukalla.
- The attackers have so far all been in traditional wooden craft
or in what may be salvaged ship's lifeboats and all inboard
powered. There have been no attacks using the Yemeni inshore
fishing boat, the outboard powered, long, fast, narrow and usually
GRP huri.
- There is no specific danger time, though early daylight hours
have featured four times.
- The craft have been engaged in no specific pre-attack
occupation. Some appear to be fishing. Three, and all the most
recent attacks, have undoubtedly been smuggling people.
- The attackers seem to include both Yemenis and Somalis, but
Somalis seem predominant.
- There is no consistent pattern. Some attackers draw close and
ask you to heave-to before firing warning shots. Others fire
warning shots and close to board immediately. One immobilised its
victim by fouling their propellers with a fishing net.
- In every incident of piracy or robbery the attackers have
always fired warning shots. They do not shoot to kill, injure or
disable the boat. They shoot to warn and intimidate.
- Attacks are pushed home fast and hard with no regard to
topsides.
- The attackers seem to have only one or two guns, usually
Kalashnikovs or the Chinese equivalent. They otherwise have
knives. Most are apparently nervous.
- The attackers do not appear to attack at night or in strong
weather, but analysis suggests that in quiet weather smugglers
crossing the Gulf of Aden from Somalia to Yemen attempt to leave
and close the coasts (make departure and arrival) in the dark and
hence cross the central Gulf of Aden during daylight hours.
Remember that these are 'gun culture' societies where
carrying a gun is a badge of status. The same is true of knives.
That a fisherman carries a gun and fires warning shots does not mean
he will shoot you in order to rob you. Ditto the carrying and
brandishing of a knife. Relatively safe waters:
- The coastal waters between Mukalla (Yemen) and Mina Salalah
(Oman) should be safe.
- From Aden through into the Red Sea along the Yemeni coast was
safe in 2000/2001/2002/2003 apart from a slight risk of petty
harassment by importunate Yemeni military and fishermen.
- Other than harassment by Yemeni military and fishermen, there
have been no incidents reported from Yemeni waters in the southern
Red Sea.
- There have been no reports of problems when approaching or
leaving Djibouti to/from Bab el Mandeb.
- Eritrean coastal waters are safe and fairly actively patrolled
by Eritrean forces.
- In practice at present, except for Danger Zones 1 and 2 below,
the safest water for an unescorted transit of the Gulf of Aden
extends south from the Yemeni coast to about one quarter to one
third the distance towards (90–100 miles N of) the Somali
coast.
Danger zones: The main danger zones at
the moment are two:
- The first appears to be in mid-Gulf of Aden W of approximately
48°50'E out to 80M N of the Somali coast, i.e. off that part of
the Somali coast NOT patrolled by the Hart Group. We advise
holding further N towards the Yemen coast, to/from the Bab el
Mandeb area. If unescorted, avoid the whole coast of Somalia out
to 90–100 miles offshore and especially from 47°30'E to Djibouti
waters.
- The second is from about 60M E of Aden until about the same
distance SW of Mukalla with the band of maximum risk between
48°10'E and 48°50'E. We would advise staying at least 20M offshore
between 49°E and 46°50'E and planning your passage, if you can
make sufficient speed to cover the approx. 50M wide band of
maximum risk in hours of darkness and in company. With the current
(e.g. headed W in winter) you'll need to be able to guarantee
5kts, against it (e.g. headed E in winter), you must be able to
make 7–8kts.
There is a potential, if lesser danger, in
the outer approaches to Djibouti. The safest approach/departure is
to approach/leave on a WSW/ENE course from/to the direction of
Aden.
Prevention and Protection: Oman The
Omani Navy is well armed, very efficient and has a base in Mina
Salalah. They actively patrol the coast. There have been no reports
of any criminal activity on the Omani coast. Contacts:
Salalah maintains listening watch on 2182kHz and Ch 16.
Harbourmaster Capt. Ahmed Burham Ba'Omar. Tel (+968) 219500 ext 420,
Fax (+968) 219253, email AhmedB@Salalahport.com.
Yemen The port authorities in Aden and Mukalla are
very concerned but, until the new coastguard is fully established
and properly trained, unable to take active measures either to
prevent robbery of yachts or to respond to distress calls, supposing
they receive them. Until 2002 this has been a product of a port
authority/military/police turf war and a failure of central
government authority in one of its governorates. To help their case
for the enhancement of the coastguard service, the port authorities
in Aden and Mukalla are anxious that ANY INCIDENT is reported to
them, whether or not the threat proves to have been real. They do
take the matter seriously although any follow up to ascertain the
facts and punish any Yemenis responsible is usually lukewarm and
clogged by red tape unless fired up by major, adverse international
publicity. Some yachts have managed to arrange
an escort with the authorities from Mukalla to the Bali Haf area.
The escort was a police inshore speed boat. The escort wanted to
coast hug whereas the yachts wanted to stand well offshore. But
despite the difference, the escort may have served its purpose.
If you are worried, ask in Mukalla or Aden if an escort can be
organized. The jointly-funded EU and USA backed
Yemeni coastguard is being trained and equipped. Delay has been
caused by wrangling between the USA and EU, presumably over whose
systems and equipment prevail ... and therefore who gets to increase
a sphere of influence and score a nice contract or two, but recent
news suggest at least there are now positive and active
developments. Contacts: Aden: Harbourmaster, VHF Ch16 from
about 25M and SSB 2182kHz to about 100M. Tel: office + 9762 202850;
Duty Officer +9762 202262, 202238; fax +9762 206241. An IMO
officer in Aden, Capt Roy Facey (Tel/fax +9762 203521), is another
helpful contact. Mukalla: Harbour pilots, Captains Salem and
Amin. VHF Ch 16 to about 25M and on SSB 2182kHz to about 60M. Tel:
Mukalla 354742; mobile 7951076
Puntland/Somalia A north Somali (Puntland) coastguard
has been established using a Bermuda registered company and a
British registered ex-fisheries protection vessel, the Celtic
Horizon, a 65-metre, former stern trawler. The HART Group Ltd.
(set up and run by an ex-British SAS officer) has informed us that
they operate a Fishery Protection force and Coast Guard in the
Somali State of Puntland. The area covered is from 100 miles west of
Bosaso (roughly 47°30'E), round the Horn of Africa to Eyl, on the
Indian Ocean coast. The trawler acts as a mother ship to several
fast RIBs operated by armed men. Contacts: The Hart Group
can be contacted in London: +44 20 7751 0771 or in Somalia +252 572
6121, fax +252 523 6104, email george.simm@talk21.com
Djibouti There is no Djiboutian maritime force that
operates offshore. The French Navy have a presence in Djibouti and
NATO forces (in spring 2003 under German command) are now using the
port as a base. A watch is reportedly kept by the French on MF
2182kHz and VHF Chs 12 and 16 but distress calls may not be heard
unless the call is made within a short distance of Djibouti. You can
try to alert them BEFORE your transit to ascertain how best to get
help if you need it. You will need to be able to speak French.
Contacts: French Navy (la Marine Française) tel: +253 351
351 or + 253 35 03 48. Ask for OPO (officier permanent d'opération).
Eritrea There have been no recent cases of
piracy or robbery affecting yachts reported in or near Eritrean
waters. In periods of heightened tension however, for example during
the Yemen/Eritrea conflict over the Hanish Is, yachts straying into
sensitive areas have been detained. The Eritrean forces patrol
coastal waters and may stop you and ask to see your papers. Their
vessels are somewhat ramshackle. They may respond to a distress
call, but don't rely on it.
US Navy This is a long
shot but they are known to maintain a LISTENING WATCH ONLY on the
following schedule. NATO navy patrol vessels may also monitor these
frequencies:
| Location/area |
Frequency (USB) |
Hours
of service (Z/UT) |
| Indian
Ocean/Red Sea/ |
|
|
| Diego
Garcia |
13201·0kHz |
24hr |
| |
11176·0kHz |
1500–0200 |
| |
6738·0kHz |
1200–2200 |
| |
|
|
| Central
& E Med., |
23227·0kHz |
0700–1500 |
| Straits
of Hormuz & |
15015·0kHz |
0500–0200 |
| Persian
Gulf |
13244·0kHz |
24hr |
| |
11176·0kHz |
24hr |
| |
6738·0kHz |
1500–0700 |
| |
3137·0kHz |
2000–0500 | In addition there is a
USN correspondence frequency, watch times unknown and believed to be
also used by keen retired USN personnel, of 14467·0 kHz which might
work when all else is silent. The US Navy was called on one of the
above frequencies when a yacht was being shadowed suspiciously on
passage between Pakistan and the Straits of Hormuz and in short
order a helicopter arrived. Whether that would happen in the Gulf of
Aden we do not know, but any route to potential help is worth
having. Strategy and tactics DO NOT
OVERESTIMATE THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN ATTACK. UNLESS YOU HEAR SHOTS, BE
FRIENDLY. DO NOT PANIC. LEARN SOME ARABIC. USE THE HELP THE LOCAL
AUTHORITIES CAN GIVE BUT BE PREPARED TO RELY ONLY ON EACH OTHER.
MAKE SURE YOUR REAL VALUABLES ARE WELL HIDDEN. HAVE SOME NICE
PICKINGS VISIBLE INCLUDING A SMALL AMOUNT OF CASH (US$50–100) IN A
WALLET OR SOMEWHERE THAT LOOKS LIKE YOUR 'SAFE'.
- Inform local port authorities (NOT agents, Immigration,
Customs or anyone else) in Salalah, Mukalla, Aden, Djibouti or the
HART Group of your passage plan and ask them to inform your next
port of your eta (see contacts in Prevention and protection). If
you have Inmarsat or can otherwise contact Djibouti, try to alert
NATO naval HQ there of your impending passage.
- If you are apprehensive, don't be afraid to ask for an escort.
Keep in regular touch with your port of departure for as long as
you can. Contact your port of arrival as early as possible and
regularly thereafter.
- While transiting the Gulf of Aden, prepare your boat against
boarding by robbers – secure important valuables out of sight,
hide any portable GPS, VHF or satphone, leave some attractive
goodies on display, have some cash "hidden" where it can easily be
found.
- If you can get an escort organized, well and good. Otherwise
sail in convoy – ideally at least three or four in a group.
- Sail in loose company no more than ½ mile apart. This allows
swift concentration for mutual aid, but disperses the 'target' and
presents a dilemma for a single attacker.
NOTE: two downsides
of sticking too close to each other:
- in the case of begging fishermen, you present a concentrated
area of rich pickings.
- in the case of armed attack, especially by multiple craft,
you may all get hit.
- Use codes for position reporting if you lose sight of each
other. (The simplest is a bearing and distance from an agreed
reference position known only to the boats in company.)
- At night run without lights. If you are worried about nearby
shipping, ONLY use deck level port, starboard and stern lights.
- Agree on how your convoy will maintain contact visually at
night. (Hourly illumination of all round white masthead lights for
a minute or two works well.)
- If you have it, use radar actively. Try to identify contacts
before they have you visual and steer to stay beyond visual range
(in effect about 4–5M, though note incident 1 above and the first
radar contact at 1·5M).
- Don't chatter on VHF.
a. NEVER broadcast your position in
clear; pirates who attack ships in the Far East (S Malacca
Straits) are reported to monitor VHF and use frequency scanners,
though they aren't usually interested in small fry like yachts.
There has been no indication that Gulf of Aden pirates are that
sophisticated. b. In company ONLY exchange NECESSARY messages
and ALWAYS on LO-POWER.
- Inform yourself and make sure all your group know of emergency
frequencies and contacts for aid e.g. French Navy, US Navy and the
Harbourmasters in the Gulf of Aden ports of Aden, Mukalla and
Salalah.
- REMEMBER, if you are approached, TRY TO BE FRIENDLY. Smile,
offer a welcome. If your contacts aren't pirates, you get off on
the right foot. If they are, at least you've helped keep the
temperature low. Some approaches will be by armed military
patrols. The soldiers are poor, they would like to share your
plenty. An early offer of baksheesh by you will avoid an ugly
demand by them. Others will be curious fishermen, probably anxious
to trade their fish for goodies hard to come by where they live.
Their lives are hard and hazardous but they may also be
armed.
IF THERE IS A SHIP NEAR BY, PLEASE TRY TO NOTE ITS NAME
AND PORT OF REGISTRY (see Follow-up below for why).
- If you are SURE these are pirates who are AGGRESSIVELY AND
ACTIVELY PURSUING YOU, IMMEDIATELY broadcast an alert using ALL
means (SSB, VHF, SATCOMS and mobile phone if you can get a signal
(note that Aden's network is NOT reliable because the government
occasionally switches it off for internal security reasons)). It's
worth a try even if help is not forthcoming.
- If pursuit closes and shots are fired, send a MAYDAY and send
up PARACHUTE FLARES. Then SURRENDER. You can try warning shots if
you are armed but remember, they may be better armed and meaner
minded than you. Try to be polite. Don't try to keep things back
unless they are very well hidden. Don't forget that early,
seemingly VALUABLE concessions may prove enough to satisfy. Your
valuables can be replaced; your life can't.
Arms or
not? As incident 5 above shows, sometimes a gun seems to work.
But you must be aware of the downsides. You
must choose the right weapon – close or long range, single or
multiple shot, etc. You must decide whether to license it or keep it
aboard unlicensed. You then have to decide whether to declare or
hide it at each port of entry. Come the hour,
you have two choices. To shoot first and hope you scare the
blighters off. Or wait till they shoot and hope that either you'll
then drive or scare them away (as in incident 5) or that you'll win
any subsequent firefight. In any case you will
have to use your gun swiftly, accurately and to potentially deadly
effect – that is, you MUST shoot to inflict SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE AND
INJURY in order effectively to deter. You will have to live with the
consequences, be they legal or psychological. Remember, in a 'gun
culture' using firearms to intimidate is 'normal'. If warning shots
are fired and you shoot back and injure or kill, you risk
discovering that it's heads they win, tails you lose. Up to you, but
we'd advise against (see Strategy & tactics 14
above).
Follow-up: If you are unlucky enough to be a
piracy victim, or feel you have been threatened by potential piracy,
please, while you can still remember the details, log:
- date, time and position of attack or approach
- direction of approach and description of suspect craft
(including colour, size, means of
- propulsion, design (local or modern imported), construction
material (GRP, wood, etc.), any
- conspicuous features and any name or numbers
- description and number of crew on suspect craft, whether in
uniform or not & whether armed and with what
- description of any contact made (nature of gestures, messages
passed, language used, etc.)
- details of any injuries sustained
- details of any damage to your vessel
- details of items stolen (description, serial numbers,
etc.)
- details of last direction in which pirates were observed to be
moving (approx. course & speed)
- if there was a ship nearby which ignored your distress call,
its name, port of registry, approximate course and
speed.
These details should be given to the authorities
in Salalah, Mukalla, Aden, Djibouti or the Hart Group as appropriate
(for contact details see above). Please also
inform us so we can keep this information up to date, email
Morgdav@aol.com (cc Imrays, ilnw@imray.com) and, especially so that
ships' failure to respond to distress messages can be followed up,
Mike Devonshire at the joint ISAF/IMO sub-committee which targets
piracy of pleasure craft email to piracy@isaf.co.uk. Patrick
Flouriot, flouriot@online.fr, would also like to be
informed.
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